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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) 
and§78-31a-19(l). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1
 f Whether District Court Judge Robert Hilder properly denied Park West 
Associates' and Beaver Creek Associates' (hereinafter collectively "Park West") Motion to 
Compel Arbitration on the bases that the "arbitration" provision in the parties contract failed to 
provide for meaningful arbitration and failed to provide CFI with any meaningful remedy. 
"A trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration presents a question of law which 
[appellate courts] review for correctness." Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357, 360 (Utah 1996). 
2. Whether Judge Hilder's ruling should also be affirmed on the basis that the instant 
dispute between CFI and Park West does not fall within the ambit of the "arbitration" provision 
in the parties' contract. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm a 'judgment, order 
or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record/ 
even though that ground or theory was no identified by the lower court as a basis for the ruling." 
Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers 
Ass'n. 23 Utah 2d 222, 225 n.2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)). 
3. Whether Judge Hilder's ruling should also be affirmed on the basis that Park West 
waived any right it may have had to seek arbitration in this case. "It is well settled that an 
appellate court may affirm a 'judgment, order or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any 
legal ground or theory apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not 
identified by the lower court as a basis for the ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 
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(Utah 1998) (quoting Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n. 23 Utah 2d 222, 225 n.2, 461 
P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (1969)). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section § 78-31a-4(l) of the Utah Arbitration Act provides in pertinent part: 
"If an issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of 
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and order or 
deny arbitration accordingly." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) 
Section 78-3 lb-2(4) of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act provides: 
"Arbitration means a private hearing before a neutral or panel of neutrals who 
hear the evidence, consider the contentions of the parties, and enter a written 
award to resolve the issues presented pursuant to Section 78-3 lb-6." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
On June 14, 1998, Park West and CFI entered into a real estate purchase contract (the 
"Contract") by which Park West agreed to sell, and CFI agreed to purchase, a twenty-acre parcel 
of property in the Canyon Meadows Development in Summit County (the "Frostwood Parcel") 
for Fifteen Million Dollars ($15,000,000). Park West breached the Contract by failing to comply 
with the terms and conditions of the Contract and by pursuing, instead, an alternative buyer for 
the property. Park West wrongfully terminated the Contract and pursued development of the 
Frostwood Parcel with another developer. CFI sued Park West for breach of contract and sought 
specific performance of the Contract. Park West filed a counterclaim against CFI asserting five 
causes of action including a quiet title claim, a breach of contract claim, a claim for breach of the 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a claim of waiver and estoppel, and a claim for wrongful 
lien. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On November 9, 1999, CFI filed a Complaint in the Third District Court against Park 
West seeking specific performance of the Contract and damages for Park West's breach of that 
Contract. (R. 1-7). On December 7, 1999, Park West filed its Answer and Counterclaim 
seeking, among other things, to quiet title to the Frostwood Parcel. (R. 17-57). On December 8, 
1999, Park West filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of CFFs Complaint in its 
entirety. On January 10, 2000, the trial court heard arguments on Park West's Motion to 
Dismiss. (R. 58-204). On January 14, 2000, the trial court issued a Minute Entry in which it 
dismissed CFFs claim for specific performance but not its claim for damages. (R. 423-426). 
The Minute Entry was reduced to a formal order on February 28, 2000. (R. 461-477). On 
February 4, 2000, the parties participated in an attorney's planning conference and agreed upon 
dates for the litigation. (R. 510-512). On February 4, 2000, the parties submftted their stipulated 
Scheduling Order to the trial court. (R. 449-451). On March 3, 2000, the parties exchanged their 
Initial Disclosures. (R. 478-479). On March 9, 2000, Park West filed a Motion to Compel 
Arbitration. (R. 483-509). Park West's Motion to Compel Arbitration was argued to the trial 
court on May 17, 2000. (R. 548). The trial court denied Park West's motion and a formal order 
was signed by the Court on May 25, 2000. (549-551). On June 22, 2000, CFI served its first set 
of discovery requests on Park West. (R. 556). On June 23, 2000, Park West filed its Notice of 
Appeal of the order denying its motion to compel. (R. 552-555). On July 7, 2000, Park West 
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings or, Alternatively, Motion for a Protective Order. (R. 576-
585). The motion was heard by the trial court on August 16, 2000, and a formal order denying 
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the motion was issued on September 5, 2000. (R. 768-770). On September 12, 2000, Park West 
filed a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Appeal with this Court which the Court granted on 
October 17,2000. 
Statement of Retevaivt Facts 
The Underlying Dispute 
In approximately December of 1997, CFI, a condominium resort developer, began 
negotiations with Park West to purchase a parcel of property in Summit County which included 
the Frostwood Parcel. The Frostwood Parcel was an attractive investment to CFI because Park 
West was offering the property with all of the necessary zoning and permitting requirements in 
place. (See Affidavit of David Siegel ("Siegel Affid."), H 7, R. 270). Between December of 
1997 and June of 1998, the parties worked out the details of the transaction. (Id, ffif 7-12, R. 
270-271). On or about June 14, 1998, CFI and Park West executed a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (the "Contract") which provided for the sale of the Frostwood Parcel to CFI for Fifteen 
Million Dollars ($15,000,000). ( A true and correct copy of the Contract is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, R. 279-284)). CFI paid Park West an earnest money deposit of $50,000. (Siegel 
Affid., f 10, R. 271.). 
The sale was scheduled to close on or before December 31, 1998, before which time Park 
West was to obtain all of the necessary governmental approvals for CFI's planned condominium 
development. (Id at K 18, R. 272-273 & 279-284). Between June and December CFI expended 
significant time and resources preparing for the development of the condominium project on the 
Frostwood Parcel. (IcL at 16, R. 272). Despite Park West's promises, it failed diligently to 
pursue the necessary governmental approvals, allowed the time for closing to lapse, and pursued 
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another purchaser for the Frostwood Parcel. (Id. at f^ [ 18-28, R. 227-275). CFI initiated its 
lawsuit against Park West for specific performance and breach of contract. (Id at 128, R. 275). 
The Contract's Dispute Resolution Provisions 
The Contract, including its Addendum No. 1, was prepared and signed by the parties on 
or about June 14, 1998. (R. 279-284). Addendum 1 to the Contract was not an amendment 
and/or modification of the Contract, but rather, an integral part of the Contract which contained 
additional terms and clarifications. (Siegel Affid., ^ 13, R. 271-272). 
The Contract contains three provisions relating to the resolution of disputes. Those 
provisions are found in Sections 15 and 16 of the main body to the Contract and Paragraph 12 of 
Addendum 1. Section 15 of the Contract provides in pertinent part as follows: 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to 
this Contract, including but not limited the disposition of the Earnest Money 
Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to 
mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association.... If mediation fails, the procedures 
applicable to and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in 
this provision shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the 
Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the Seller by means of a 
summons or otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard 
to the action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from answering 
the complaint pending mediation. The parties may agree in writing to waive 
mediation. 
(R. 282) (emphasis added). Section 16 of the Contract further provides that if Seller defaults 
under the Contract, Buyer may "sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages." (R. 282). 
Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract relates to one particular type of dispute— 
disagreements over terms. Section 12 provides: 
Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by the 
parties agreed upon by both parties. If agreement cannot be reached within 60 
days from the beginning of an arbitration process Buyer shall receive its money 
back and this agreement shall be null and void. 
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(R. 283) (emphasis added). 
CFI understood Section 12 of Addendum 1 to apply in only one circumstance—when the 
parties needed quickly to resolve a disagreement over the terms of the Contract. CFI did not 
understand Section 12 to limit its right to pursue litigation against Park West if Park West 
breached the Contract and refused to perform. CFI intended to retain its right to sue Park West 
for breach of contract. (Siegel Affid., fflf 30-31, R. 275). 
On or about the day the Contract was signed, Park West took care to see that provisions 
of the Contract were consistent by crossing out certain provisions that were in conflict with other 
provisions in the Contract. (Id at f 14, R. 272). Although Park West crossed out certain 
provision in the Contract, it did not cross out any provision relating to resolution of disputes. 
(14) 
Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 does not contemplate a binding award from neutral 
arbitrators. Rather, the provision contemplates resolution by "agreement" of the parties which 
agreement must occur within sixty (60) days. (R. 283). At the hearing on Park West's motion to 
compel, Park West's counsel acknowledged: "The exclusive remedy under this arbitration 
clause is that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void." (R. 741,11. 13-14) (emphasis 
added). See generally the discussion between Judge Hilder and Mark Gaylord at R. 738-742, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
Park West's Pursuit of Litigation Rather Than Arbitration 
On November 9, 1999, CFI filed its Complaint for breach of contract, specific 
performance and damages. In the Complaint, CFI articulated its willingness to pursue mediation 
with Park West and provided that defendants could refrain from answering the Complaint 
pending the outcome of the mediation. (R. 1-7) 
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On December 8, 1999, rather than pursuing mediation with CFI, Park West served its 
Answer and Counterclaim to the Complaint. The Answer included fourteen affirmative 
defenses. Nowhere in the Answer or in any of the affirmative defenses, did Park West assert that 
Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract barred CFI's lawsuit. (R. 50-57). 
Although Park West mentioned in its Counterclaim the existence of Paragraph 12, it 
made no claims based upon that provision. Instead, it asserted five causes of action against CFI 
seeking judgment from the trial court on substantive issues including: 1) a judgment that the 
Contract terminated by its own terms, that the lis pendens was void, and that title to the property 
in dispute should be quieted in Park West (R. 39, f 46); 2) a judgment that the lis pendens was a 
wrongful lien (R. 37, % 55); 3) a judgment that CFI delayed in bringing the action and has waived 
its right to assert its claims (R. 36, K 60); 4) a judgment that CFI breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in the Contract (R. 36, U 63); and 5) a judgment that CFI breached the 
Contract by failing to submit documentation required under the Contract (R. 35, f 67). Park 
West, in its Counterclaim, also affirmatively alleged that jurisdiction and venue were proper in 
the trial court. (R. 49, ff 4-5). Park West has never filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA 
or any other entity. 
On December 8, 1999, instead of filing a motion to compel arbitration, Park West filed a 
Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. (R. 59-115). Although styled as a motion to dismiss, the 
motion was supported with nine affidavits. (R. 116-188). Consequently, Judge Hilder properly 
treated the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. (R. 462). The relief set forth 
in Park West's Motion to Dismiss was very specific and sought a complete resolution of all 
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substantive issues in the case: The motion stated: 
This is an action seeking specific performance of a real estate 
purchase contract that automatically terminated by its own terms over eleven 
months ago. The contract provided that closing would occur on the earlier of 
December 31, 1998 or fifteen days after Final Master Plan approval, that the 
"[ejntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density, 
zoning and use," and that time was of the essence. Because Summit County 
never gave its approval and the transaction failed to close by December 31, 
1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated by its own terms on 
December 31. 1998. Therefore. PWA respectfully requests this Court 
dismiss this action, with prejudice, on the grounds that CFI cannot state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. 
(R. 60) (emphasis added). A true and correct copy of Park West's Motion to Dismiss is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C." At the hearing on Park West's Motion to Dismiss, counsel for 
Park West repeatedly emphasized that Park West was seeking a dismissal of the action, not an 
order from the Court compelling arbitration. (See R. 662,11. 21-22; R. 685,11. 19-24; R. 728,1. 
20 to 729,1. 1). 
In a Minute Entry dated January 14, 2000, the Court partially granted Park West's motion 
dismissing CFFs claim for specific performance and ordering the release of the lis pendens. The 
Court allowed CFI to proceed on its claim for breach of contract and damages. (R. 423-426). 
The ruling was reduced to a formal order on February 28, 2000. (R. 461-465). 
After the trial court issued its minute entry on Park West's motion to compel, Park West 
continued to participate in the litigation. On February 4, 2000, attorneys for CFI and for Park 
West participated in a Rule 26(f) attorney's scheduling conference. In that conference, Park 
West and CFI discussed the nature of the claims and defenses, agreed upon a date for the 
exchange of initial disclosures and set various dates for the litigation. At no time during the 
attorney's planning conference did Park West's counsel indicate that Park West would be 
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moving to compel arbitration and did not intend to proceed with the litigation as scheduled. (R. 
510-512). On February 4, 2000, Park West's counsel executed the proposed Scheduling Order 
which was submitted to the Court. The order contained no reference to arbitration. (R. 449-
451). A true and correct copy of the Scheduling Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "D." On 
March 3, 2000, the parties exchanged their initial disclosures. (R. 478-479). Nowhere in Park 
West's initial disclosures did Park West indicate its intent to pursue arbitration and seek 
dismissal of this action 
On March 9, 2000, Park West filed its first Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 483-509). 
By the time this motion was filed, Park West had filed and served approximately thirty pleadings 
and other papers. (R. 8-13, 17-209, 215-256, 418-421, 449-451, 454-465 & 478-479). CFI had 
filed and served approximately 13 pleadings and other papers, most of which were responding to 
papers submitted by Park West. (R. 1-7, 14-16, 210, 211-212, 257-354, 358-417, 428-439 & 
446-448). By the Motion to Compel, the record already consisted of 482 pages of documents (R. 
1-482). 
Prior to the filing of Park West's Motion to Compel Arbitration, CFI incurred substantial 
legal fees responding to Park West's counterclaim, briefing and arguing Park West's Motion to 
Dismiss, discussing the claims and defense and negotiating a Scheduling Order for the action, 
preparing initial disclosures, and preparing discovery to be served in the action. (R. 510-512) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Judge Hilder properly concluded that Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract did 
not provide CFI with a meaningful option to arbitrate. Judge Hilder also recognized that 
Paragraph 12, as interpreted by Park West, provided CFI with no remedy for its breach of 
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contract claims. Both of these arguments provided a proper basis upon which to deny Park 
West's Motion to Compel. Therefore, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial court. 
Even if Paragraph 12 was a valid arbitration provision, which it is not, that provision was 
only intended to apply to legitimate disagreements over the terms of the parties' Contract. It was 
not intended to apply to claims for breach of contract and for termination, which claims were 
specifically referenced in, and governed by, Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. Therefore, the 
Court may affirm the decision of the trial court on this alternative ground. 
Even if Paragraph 12 had provided for meaningful arbitration, which it did not, and even 
if CFI's claims for breach of Contract had fallen under that provision, which they do not, Park 
West waived its right to pursue arbitration long before it filed its Motion to Compel. By 
answering CFI's Complaint without asserting the right of arbitration, filing multiple 
counterclaims against CFI for affirmative relief, moving for the complete dismissal of all CFI's 
claims and to quiet title to the Frostwood Parcel, and by participating in scheduling, initial 
disclosures and other aspects of the litigation, Park West participated in the litigation to a point 
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. CFI has been prejudiced by Park West's substantial 
participation in the litigation. Therefore, the Court may affirm the decision of the trial court on 
this alternative ground of waiver. 
ARGUMENT 
In the trial court, CFI presented the Court with two bases upon which to deny Park 
West's Motion to Compel Arbitration. First, CFI argued that Park West had waived any right it 
may have had to arbitrate by its aggressive litigation tactics and failure to timely pursue 
arbitration. Second, CFI argued that the clear language of the Contract entitled CFI to pursue 
litigation for its breach of contract claims and that the "arbitration" provision in the Contract 
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simply does not apply to those claims. Judge Hilder denied Park West's motion on the 
alternative grounds that the "arbitration" provision relied upon by Park West does not provide for 
true arbitration and does not provide CFI with an adequate remedy for CFFs breach of contract 
claims. Each of these arguments is sufficient in and of itself to support the trial court's decision.1 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED PARK WEST'S MOTION 
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION FOR THE REASONS PROVIDED BY 
JUDGE HILDER. 
A. Paragraph 12 Does Not Provide CFI With A Meaningful Arbitration 
Option. 
It is well settled in this State that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate its contract 
disputes unless it has expressly agreed to arbitration. As this Court has recognized, while there is 
a public policy which favors arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of resolving 
controversies, "these considerations cannot outweigh the constitutional right of access to the 
courts unless one waives that right/' Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998). 
"Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration 
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Communications 
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 1418, 89 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1986). This is 
because "a party who has not agreed to arbitrate will normally have a right to a court's 
decision about the merits of its dispute." First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 115 S. Ct. 1920, 1923, 131 L.Ed. 2d 985 (1995). Thus, "although there is a 
presumption in favor of arbitration, a party will not be required to arbitrate when it has 
not agreed to do so." Tropical Cruise Lines, S.A. v. Vesta Ins. Co., 805 F. Supp. 409, 
412 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (citations omitted). "We must first conclude that arbitration is a 
remedy which has been bargained for by the parties. Only when such agreement on 
arbitration exists may we encourage arbitration by liberal interpretation of the arbitration 
provisions themselves." Reed v. Davis School Dist, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
1
 This Court may affirm the trial Court on any appropriate basis. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 
1260 (Utah 1998). 
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The question before this Court is whether Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract 
provides a meaningful arbitration option. The answer lies in the definition of "arbitration." Park 
West attempts to compel arbitration under the authority of the Utah Arbitration Act. That Act 
does not contain a definition of "arbitration," however, it presumes that an "award" will be 
rendered and requires that "[t]he arbitration award shall be in writing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-
31a-10 (1985). The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, a close companion to the Utah 
Arbitration Act, defines "arbitration" as "a private hearing before a neutral or panel of neutrals 
who hear the evidence, consider the contentions of the parties, and enter a written award to 
resolve the issues presented pursuant to Section 78-3 lb-6." (Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-2(4) 
(emphasis added). Blacks Law Dictionary defines arbitration as "[a] method of dispute 
resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are usu. agreed to by the disputing 
parties and whose decision is binding." Blacks Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added). 
Webster's defines "arbitration" as "the hearing and determination of a dispute or the settling of 
differences between parties by a person or persons chosen or agreed to by them." Random House 
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (1999) (emphasis added). Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has recognized that "[arbitration customarily results in an award which is enforceable by filing 
with the district court and confirmation of the award. Arbitration always includes presentation of 
the conflicting claims to a neutral third party or panel for resolution." Reed v. Davis County 
School District, 892 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted)(arbitration unnecessary because the elements had not been met). It is evident from all 
of these sources, that arbitration involves a process that results in a "decision" and/or "award" 
from the arbitrator. 
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Paragraph 12 of Addendum 1 to the Contract, simply does not provide for a true 
arbitration process and CFI has acknowledged as much. Paragraph 12 provides: 
Any disagreement over the terms of this agreement shall be arbitrated by parties 
agreed upon by both the Buyer and the Seller. If agreement cannot be reached 
within 60 days from the beginning of the arbitration process Buyer shall receive 
its money back and this agreement shall be null and void. 
(Exhibit A, Addendum 1, Paragraph 12). Although Paragraph 12 uses the term "arbitrate," it 
does not require any kind of determination by neutral third parties and does not contemplate an 
award. To the contrary, the only resolution contemplated in the provision, if any, is a resolution 
by "agreement." Park West's counsel, Mark Gaylord, conceded at the hearing that Paragraph 12 
is not an arbitration provision. During the hearing Judge Hilder asked Mr. Gaylord: "But you 
don't reach agreement on an arbitration, do you, Mr. Gaylord? It's imposed upon you." (R. 738, 
11. 20-21). Mr. Gaylord had no choice but to concede: "Ordinarily, yes your Honor." (R. 738, L 
22). Later in the hearing Mr. Gaylord acknowledged that "[t]he exclusive remedy under this 
arbitration clause is that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void." (R. 741,11. 13-14) 
(emphasis added). Judge Hilder properly recognized that resolution by "agreement" was not 
arbitration and, therefore, the trial court could not compel CFI to arbitrate its claims for breach of 
contract. 
On appeal, Park West argues that Paragraph 12 of the Addendum provides for arbitration 
but simply limits the scope of the arbitrator's authority and the amount of time in which the 
arbitration can occur. CFI does not dispute the general proposition that parties may define the 
scope of an arbitrator's authority and the amount of time for an arbitration. However, Paragraph 
12, as interpreted by Park West, does much more than that. It divests the arbitrator of any 
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authority, does away with a meaningful arbitration award, and leaves any "dispute resolution" to 
the "agreement" of the parties, if at all. 
Park West attempts to support its position by citing three cases from other jurisdictions— 
Colorado, Hawaii and Alaska. None of Park West's cases have any binding effect in Utah. 
More importantly, none of them support Park West's position. In the Colorado case, the dispute 
involved the appointment of an arbitrator affiliated with one of the parties. City and County of 
Denver v. District Court. 939 P.2d 1353 (Colo. 1997). The Colorado Court concluded that the 
parties could contract to use a non-neutral arbitrator "so long as the ADR clause provides for 
judicial review of the official's determination." Id at 1365. Significantly, the provision in that 
contract contemplated that the dispute would be resolved, not by "agreement" but by the 
arbitrator who would "determine the merits of PCL's claims." Id. Thus, City and County of 
Denver has no application to this case. 
In the Hawaii case cited by Park West, the arbitration clause, unlike Paragraph 12 here, 
provided for an award by a neutral third party. In re Clawson. 783 P.2d 1230 (Hawaii 1989). 
The parties modified this clause by agreeing to retract the arbitration if the parties settled their 
dispute before the issuance of the arbitration award. Id, at 1231. The question on appeal was 
whether the parties had reached a settlement before the arbitrator issued his ruling. Id If so, the 
award would be vacated. If not, the award would stand. Id at 1232. Because In re Clawson 
provided for valid binding arbitration in the event of no "agreement," that case does not support 
Park West's interpretation and application of Paragraph 12. 
Finally, in the Alaska case, the question was whether the arbitrator had exceeded its 
authority in making a particular award. Board of Education v. Ewig, 609 P.2d 10, 13 (Alaska 
1980). Although the Alaska court recognized that parties are free to define the scope of the 
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arbitrator's authority, the court concluded that the arbitrator had fashioned a proper remedy for 
the aggrieved party. Id. at 13-14. Nothing in the Ewig case suggests that parties can contract for 
an "arbitration" procedure that divests the arbitrator of any authority to decide the merits of the 
dispute and provides for no enforceable award. Park West cites the Court to no authority from 
Utah or from any other jurisdiction to support its unique interpretation of the law regarding 
arbitration. 
Before the trial court could compel CFI to arbitrate its claims for breach of contract, the 
court had to determine that CFI and Park West had bargained for arbitration. Jenkins v. Percival 
962 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1998); Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). Because Paragraph 12 provides for resolution by "agreement," rather than by an 
award or decision from an arbitrator, Paragraph 12 is not an arbitration provision. Therefore, 
Judge Hilder properly concluded that CFI could not be compelled to arbitrate its breach of 
contract claims. 
B. Paragraph 12, As Interpreted by Park West, Does not Provide CFI 
With a Remedy. 
Park West argued below, and continues to argue on appeal, that Paragraph 12 of the 
Contract provided CFI with "a stipulated remedy" in the event that the parties could not reach 
"agreement." (See Park West Brief at p. 12). As CFI will explain more fully in the next section 
of this brief, Paragraph 12 of the Addendum was never intended by the parties to be a 
mechanism for resolving breach of contract or termination claims. Moreover, Judge Hilder 
recognized that if Paragraph 12 was interpreted as Park West requests, it would doom CFI "to no 
remedy, nothing more than to be back where they were before." (R. 763). 
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Park West suggests that the return of CFFs $50,000 earnest money deposit is a proper 
remedy for Park West's breach and CFFs resulting loss of a $15,000,000 real estate development 
opportunity. Although Park West does not use the terminology, its argument suggests that 
Paragraph 12 is a kind of liquidated damages provision. It is clear, however, that Paragraph 12, 
as interpreted by Park West, would not survive a liquidated damages analysis. 
"Liquidated damages provisions are viewed with some degree of suspicion because they 
may not reasonably approximate compensatory damages." Robbins v. Finlav, 645 P.2d 623, 625 
(Utah 1982). "In determining the validity of a liquidated damages provision, this court has 
adopted section 339 of the Restatement of Contracts." Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington. 
942 P.2d 918, 921 (Utah 1997) (quoting Reliance Ins. Co.. 704 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1985)). 
Section 339 provides: 
"(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach fixing the damages therefor, is not 
enforceable as a contract and does not affect the damages recoverable for breach, unless 
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm that is 
caused by the breach, and 
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of 
accurate estimation." 
IcL (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 339 (1932)). 
In order to be construed and enforced as a liquidated damages provision, Paragraph 12 
must provide a remedy that is a "reasonable forecast of just compensation." Id "Where the 
damages provided for in the agreement are disproportionate to the several covenants therein 
provided, in some cases being grossly excessive and in others entirely inadequate, they will be 
construed as a penalty rather than as liquidated." DOPP v. Richards. 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98, 
338 (1913) (emphasis added). Accord Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 1985) 
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(invalidating forfeiture clause in real estate contract that was not a reasonable forecast of 
damages); Skeen v. Smith, 75 Utah 464, 286 P. 633 (1930) (acknowledging the standard but 
finding that the stipulated damages were not "entirely inadequate"). 
Here, Paragraph 12 cannot be interpreted and applied as a liquidated damages provision 
because the "remedy"—return of the CFFs earnest money deposit—in no way compensates CFI 
for its damages. As this Court has recognized, "contractual damages are measured by the lost 
benefit of the bargain, i.e, by 'the amount necessary to place the nonbreaching party in as good a 
position as if the contract had been performed.'" Young Electric Sign Co. v. Standard West, 
Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1988) (finding that the liquidated damages provision reflected this 
standard) (quoting Alexander v. Brown, 646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1995). Returning CFFs 
earnest money deposit clearly would not put CFI in the position it would have been had the 
contract been performed. In fact, it would not even put CFI in the position it was in prior to 
making the Contract. Between the time the Contract was executed and the time that it was 
supposed to close, CFI expended significant time and resources getting ready to build the 
condominium project contemplated in the Contract. Since Paragraph 12 provides CFI with no 
meaningful remedy, it cannot be interpreted as a liquidated damages provision and may not be 
enforced as such. Judge Hilder properly denied Park West's motion. 
II. THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD ALSO BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE PARAGRAPH 12 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
INSTANT DISPUTE. 
As previously discussed, Paragraph 12 of the addendum does not provide for 
meaningful arbitration and, therefore, was not a valid basis for Park West's motion to compel. 
However, even if Paragraph 12 had provided for meaningful arbitration of "disagreements over 
17 
the terms" of the Contract, that provision would not govern CFFs claims for breach of contract 
and for specific performance. 
Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract deal specifically with the resolution of breach of 
contract and wrongful termination claims. Section 15 provides in pertinent part: 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to 
this Contract, including but not limited the disposition of the Earnest Money 
Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to 
mediation in accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules 
of the American Arbitration Association. . . . If mediation fails, the procedures 
applicable to and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in 
this provision shall prohibit the Buyer from seeking specific performance by the 
Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on the Seller by means of a 
summons or otherwise permitted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard 
to the action provided that the Buyer permits the Seller to refrain from answering 
the complaint pending mediation. The parties may agree in writing to waive 
mediation. 
(R. 28) (emphasis added). Section 16 of the Contract further provides that if Seller defaults 
under the Contract, Buyer may "sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages." Id. 
Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Contract are drafted broadly to encompass "any dispute or claim 
relating to this Contract." They are also drafted narrowly to deal with any claims for "breach" or 
"termination" of the Contract. Paragraphs 15 and 16 were intended to govern the parties' 
performance of the contract. Those provisions allow CFI to initiate a suit for breach and/or 
termination so long as CFI allows Park West to refrain from answering the complaint pending 
mediation. 
Unlike Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Contract, Paragraph 12 of the Addendum was drafted 
very narrowly and only applies to a "disagreement over the terms of this agreement." Paragraph 
12 was intended by the parties to provide an expedited procedure for resolving, in a declaratory 
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fashion, legitimate disagreements regarding the terms of the Contract. CFI never thought or 
intended that Paragraph 12 of the Addendum would do away with CFFs constitutional right to 
pursue its breach of contract claims in the courts. (See Siegel Affid., Tfl[ 30-31, R. 275). 
Park West argues that Paragraph 12 of the Addendum was intended to supercede the 
broader, lengthier and more specific provisions in Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. This 
argument is belied by the fact that Park West took the time to cross out from the Contract certain 
conflicting provisions while allowing all three dispute resolution provisions to remain. Had Park 
West truly intended all disputes under the Contract to be arbitrated, it would have clearly 
provided for such and, under no circumstances, would it have allowed Sections 15 and 16 to 
remain in the Contract. 
It would be improper for this Court, as Park West requests, to read Sections 15 and 16 out 
of the Contract. See Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Baglev & Co., 928 P.2d 1047 
(Utah Ct. App. (1996), cert denied. 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997) (quoting Beuhner Block Co. v. 
UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988)). Hi-Country requires the Court to "harmonize all 
of [the Contract's] provisions and all of its terms, and all of its terms should be given effect if it 
is possible to do so." Id. at 1053. CFFs interpretation of the Contract is reasonable and 
harmonizes Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract with Paragraph 12 of the Addendum. Park 
West's does not. Therefore, the Court must adopt CFFs interpretation and find that Sections 15 
and 16 of the Contract remain valid and enforceable. 
CFI sued Park West for breaching the specific provisions of the Contract, for breaching 
its obligations of good faith and fair dealing under the Contract, and for specific performance. 
2 
CFFs Complaint specifically allowed Park West to refrain from answering the Complaint until 
the parties had completed their mediation. (R. 4). 
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(R. 0001-0007). CFI's claims clearly fall within Sections 15 and 16 of the Contract. Therefore, 
CFI is entitled to pursue its claims against Park West in the courts and Park West's motion must 
be denied. 
III. THE DECISION OF THE DISTRICT COURT MAY ALSO BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE PARK WEST WAIVED ANY RIGHT IT HAD TO 
ARBITRATE THIS DISPUTE. 
Even if Paragraph 12 of the Addendum to the Contract had provided for meaningful 
arbitration, which it did not, and even if CFI's claims for breach of Contract had fallen under that 
provision, which they do not, Park West waived its right to pursue arbitration long before it filed 
its Motion to Compel. 
For four months, Park West took advantage of every benefit that litigation had to offer in 
the hopes that the trial court would summarily dispose of CFI's claims. Ultimately, the trial 
court dismissed CFI's claim for specific performance but declined to dismiss its claims for 
damages. Only when Park West failed to achieve a complete dismissal of CFI's claims in the 
litigation did Park West decide to shift the remaining claims to arbitration. Having availed itself 
of the benefits of litigation and having obtained relief from CFI's primary claim for specific 
performance, Park West is not entitled to remove the remaining claims to arbitration. 
This Court has consistently recognized that a party, who might otherwise have the right 
to arbitrate certain disputes, can waive that right. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 
356, 360 (Utah 1992). In Chandler, the Court recognized that"[t]here is an affirmative duty to 
enforce contractual rights [and] it is not the policy of this court to allow a party to suffer 
prejudice because an opposing party has failed to timely assert a contractual right." IdL Chandler 
adopted a two-prong standard for determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitration. 
First, the court must consider whether the party claiming the right to arbitrate has "participate[d] 
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in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate." IdL Then, the court must 
determine whether the other party has suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. Id. Each of 
these standards is met in this case.3 
A. Park West's Participated in the Litigation to a Point Inconsistent with 
the Intent to Arbitrate. 
In Chandler, the plaintiff filed an action against Blue Cross. Blue Cross answered 
Chandlers complaint, "raising seventeen defenses but making no mention of the existence of an 
arbitration agreement." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 357. Blue Cross also filed cross claims against a 
co-defendant. Id. Blue Cross then participated in five months of discovery with Chandler. IcL 
Only then did Blue Cross file its motion to compel arbitration. Id. Based upon these facts the 
Court found that Blue Cross had participated in litigation to point inconsistent with the intent to 
arbitrate. 
Several of the facts which led to a finding of waiver in Chandler exist in this case. As in 
Chandler, Park West did not respond to CFFs complaint with a demand for arbitration. Instead, 
Park West filed an answer with fourteen affirmative defenses, none of which were based upon 
the alleged arbitration clause. (R. 50-52). As in Chandler, Park West also asserted affirmative 
claims in the action. Whereas in Chandler those claims were against third parties, here, the 
claims were made directly against CFI. Park West's Counterclaim asserted five separate causes 
3
 In footnote 5 to its brief, Park West suggests that CFI bears a higher standard of proof on the 
issue of waiver. Park West is wrong. No standard of review applies on the issue of waiver 
because Judge Hilder did not decide the motion on the basis of waiver. Judge Hilder concluded 
that he could not order arbitration because there was no bona-fide arbitration option. (R. 763). If 
he made any findings concerning waiver, those findings were that "there is [sic] certainly actions 
by the defendant that were inconsistent with the arbitration. On the other hand, there were 
actions that were consistent. I am not persuaded that waiver applies in this case . . . " (R. 762). 
In any event, because the facts that support CFFs waiver claim are not disputed, this Court may 
decide the issue of waiver as a matter of law. See, e.g., Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935, 940 n.3 (Utah 1993). 
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of action against CFI and sought declaratory relief and damages on each. (R. 34-34). 
Significantly, the Counterclaim affirmed both the jurisdiction and the venue of the trial court, (R. 
43, U 4-7). 
This case diverges from the facts in Chandler in that the parties did not get involved in 
extensive discovery. This fact, however, is not fatal to CFI's argument. Chandler does not 
purport to define all factual scenarios that constitute waiver. To the contrary, the Court realized 
that many different fact scenarios would support waiver. IcL at 358-359. This Court relied upon 
several factually dissimilar cases from other jurisdictions in which other courts have found 
waiver. Several of those cases are strikingly similar to the facts in this case. See Board of Educ. 
Taos Mun. Schools v. The Architects, 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985); Wood v. Millers National Ins. 
Co.. 632 P.2d 1163 (N.M. 1981); Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1162 
(5th Cir. 1986); Weight Watchers of Quebec Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Internafl Inc., 398 F. 
Supp. 1057, 1060 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). CFI urges the Court to look once again to the foregoing 
cases, apply the reasoning in those case, and find a waiver here. 
The courts in each of the foregoing cases cited in Chandler found a waiver based largely 
upon the defendant's filing of one or more substantive motions. Board of Educ. Taos Mun. 
Schools, 709 P.2d 184 (waiver due to filing several substantive motions along with motion to 
compel arbitration); Wood, 632 P.2d 1163 (waiver due to filing motion for summary judgment); 
Price, 791 F.2d 1156 (same) Weight Watchers of Quebec Ltd, 398 F. Supp. 1057 (same). As the 
New Mexico recognized, "[wjaiver of the right [to arbitration] may be inferred from any 
decision to take advantage of the judicial system, whether through discovery or direct invocation 
of the court's discretionary power, or both." IcL (emphasis added). "[T]he point of no return is 
reached when the party seeking to compel arbitration invokes the court's discretionary power, 
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prior to demanding arbitration, on a question other than its demand for arbitration." Id. at 464 
(quoting Wood, 632 P.2d at 1156-66). As the Wood case recognized, this rule is necessary 
because "[t]o hold otherwise would permit a party to resort to court action until an unfavorable 
result is reached and then switch to arbitration." Wood, 632 P.2d at 1166. Compare Weight 
Watchers of Quebec Ltd, 398 F. Supp. at 1061 ("the court has not been pointed to and has found 
no authority for the proposition that one who answers, seeks summary judgment, and awaits the 
decision on such a motion to present the question of arbitration for the first time may then 
compel arbitration."). 
In this case, Park West filed a Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. (R. 59-115). 
Although styled as a motion to dismiss, the motion was supported with nine affidavits. (R. 116-
188). The motion did not seek to compel arbitration, but rather, sought a dismissal of all of 
CFI's claims on the merits. The motion stated: 
This is an action seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase contract 
that automatically terminated by its own terms over eleven months ago. The 
contract provided that closing would occur on the earlier of December 31, 1998 or 
fifteen days after Final Master Plan approval, that the "[ejntire agreement [was] 
subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning and use," and that time 
was of the essence. Because Summit County never gave its approval, and the 
transaction failed to close by December 31, 1998, the Purchase Contract 
automatically terminated by its own terms on December 31, 1998. Therefore, 
PWA respectfully requests this Court dismiss this action, with prejudice, on the 
grounds that CFI cannot state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
(R. 60) (emphasis added). At the hearing on its motion to dismiss, Park West made it 
clear that it was seeking a substantive ruling on all of CFI's claims. Counsel for Park West 
requested the Court to "dismiss this action and have quiet title in its favor." (R. 662,11. 21-22). 
(See also R. 728,1. 20 to 729,1. 1)) 
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On January 14, 2000, the trial court issued a detailed minute entry setting forth its ruling 
on Park West's Motion to Dismiss. The Court dismissed CFI's primary claim for specific 
performance but declined to dismiss CFI's claims against Park West for damages. That ruling 
was reduced to a formal order on February 28, 2000. Having obtained the principal relief it 
desired from the trial court, Park West then opted to pursue the remaining claims in arbitration. 
On March 9, 2000, Park West filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration. By invoking the District 
Court's discretionary power and seeking summary judgment on all of CFI's claims, Park West 
waived any right it may have had to pursue arbitration. 
Finally, Park West engaged in other activities during the litigation, absent in Chandler, 
which clearly expressed Park West's intent to litigate rather than mediate. On February 4, 2000, 
Park West participated in a Rule 26(f) attorney's scheduling conference. In that conference, Park 
West and CFI discussed the nature of the claims and defenses, agreed upon a date for the 
exchange of initial disclosures and set various dates for the litigation. At no time during the 
attorney's planning conference did counsel for Park West voice its plan to pursue arbitration. (R. 
510-512). On February 4, 2000, Park West's counsel executed and submitted a Scheduling 
Order to the trial court which order contained no reference to arbitration. (R. 449-451). On 
March 3, 2000, the parties exchanged their initial disclosures. (R. 478-479). Nowhere in Park 
West's initial disclosures did Park West indicate its intent to pursue arbitration. All of these 
actions manifested Park West's intent to pursue litigation rather than arbitration. 
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Under the analysis in Chandler and the cases cited therein, Park West participated in the 
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.4 All of Park West's actions satisfy 
the first prong of the Chandler analysis. 
B. CFI Suffered Prejudice as a Result of Park West's Delay in Moving 
for Arbitration. 
This Court in Chandler identified three forms of prejudice that can result from a 
defendant's delay in moving to compel arbitration. 
Courts have recognized that prejudice can occur if a party gains an advantage in 
arbitration through participation in pretrial procedures. Courts have also stated 
that prejudice exists when the party seeking arbitration is attempting to forum-
shop after "the judicial waters [have]. . . been tested." In addition, prejudice has 
been found in situations where the party seeking arbitration allows the opposing 
party to undergo the types of expenses that arbitration is designed to alleviate, 
such as the expense of preparing to argue important pretrial motions or the 
expense of conducting discovery procedures that are not available in arbitration. 
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield. 833 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1992) (quoting Wood. 632 P.2d at 
1165). "[A]ny real detriment is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice." Id at 360. Each 
form of prejudice exists in this case. 
4
 In its brief, Park West suggests that it preserved its right to arbitrate by sending CFI a letter 
demanding arbitration and by referencing the right to arbitrate in a few documents filed with the 
Court. Knowing that one may have a right, and exercising that alleged right, are two very 
different things. "[TJhere is an affirmative duty to enforce contractual rights." Chandler. 833 
P.2d at 360 (emphasis added). If Park West intended to arbitrate, it was obligated to do so, rather 
than to pursue the litigation with CFI. At the hearing on it motion to dismiss Park West 
acknowledged its "option" of arbitration but clearly made it known that it was holding that 
option in abeyance. Counsel for Park West stated: " . . . at the very most, all they have, I guess 
I'm saying, and whether we compel arbitration or not, which is certainly an option we all have, is 
they have a breach of contract claim for damages." (R.689,11. 1-4) (emphasis added). Later in 
the hearing, Park West presented the trial court with two options, neither of which was for 
arbitration. Park West's counsel stated: "I guess my point is the Court can do one of two things. 
It can dismiss the case outright, based upon my argument; or two, if it feels they have at least 
established enough to withstand the motion to dismiss, it can move forward. My suggestion and 
what I think the law says is that it can only move forward on a claim of damages...." (R. 685, 
11. 19-24). Though Park West knew of its alleged right to arbitrate, it consciously chose not to 
exercise that right until four months into the litigation. That constitutes waiver. 
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•. . 1. . Park West Has Gained An Advantage in the Arbitration Through Its 
Use of Pretrial Procedures, 
Through its Motion to Dismiss, Park West succeeded in disposing of CFI's claim for 
specific performance. If, as Park West suggests, all of the disputes regarding the parties' 
Contract were subject to arbitration, the arbitrator should also have determined CFI's right to 
specific performance. With the decision of the trial court dismissing CFI's claim for specific 
performance, and Park West's subsequent development of the Frostwood Parcel with another 
developer, CFI has lost forever the right to specific performance under the Contract. Clearly, 
Park West has gained a significant advantage in the arbitration to the great prejudice of CFI. 
Having taken affirmative advantage of the trail court to eliminate CFI's principal claim, Park 
West is hardly in a position to complaint about having to litigate CFFs damages claim in the 
same tribunal. 
2. CFI Has Been Prejudiced by Park West's Attempts to Forum-Shop. 
Park West filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title seeking to dispose of all of CFI's 
claims as a matter of law. Its efforts were only partially successful. CFI's claims for breach of 
contract and damages remain. Having failed to obtain complete dismissal of CFI's claims, Park 
West then sought a more favorable forum for the resolution of the remaining claims. A forum in 
which Park West candidly acknowledges that CFI's only recovery will be the restoration of its 
$50,000 earnest money deposit—an amount that does not begin to compensate CFI for its 
damages. As recognized in Chandler, this litigation strategy constitutes prejudice. 
26 
3. Park West's Delay Has Caused CFI to Incur the Types of Costs that 
Arbitration Is Designed to Avoid. 
CFI was prejudiced by having to respond to Park West's Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet 
Title. As the Court in Chandler recognized, prejudice may result from "the expense of preparing 
to argue important pretrial motions." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359. See also Pledger v. Gillespie, 
982 P.2d 572, 577 (Utah 1999) (noting the prejudice that occurs from "incurring expenses that 
would not have been incurred in arbitration, e.g., preparing to argue important pretrial motions or 
conducting discovery not available in arbitration."). In addition to the tremendous costs incurred 
to defend against Park West's Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title, CFI incurred additional 
unnecessary litigation expenses including the costs to meet and confer with Park West, schedule 
litigation dates, prepare Initial Disclosures, and prepare discovery requests to be served on Park 
West. CFI was prejudiced from having to incur these additional litigation expenses. 
Prior to March 9, 2000, Park West too full advantage of the benefits of litigation. Most 
significantly, it sought and obtained from the trial court the dismissal of CFFs primary claim for 
specific performance. Only when Park West failed to obtain the dismissal of all CFFs claims, 
did it opt to pursue the arbitration of CFFs remaining claims. Park West has cited the Court to 
no authority, and none exists, in which courts have allowed for a piecemeal arbitration practice. 
If Park West was entitled to arbitrate the claims in the lawsuit, it was obligated to arbitrate all of 
those claims, including CFFs claim for specific performance. Because there is no practical way 
to restore CFFs claim for specific performance and to allow all claims to proceed to arbitration, 
Park West has lost the right to pursue any claims in arbitration. CFI has demonstrated both 
prongs of the Chandler waiver test. Judge Hilder could have denied Park West's motion to 
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compel on the basis of waiver. Therefore, this Court should affirm Judge Hilder's denial of the 
motion to compel on the additional theory of waiver. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, CFI respectfully request this Court to affirm the 
district court's denial of Park West's Motion to Compel. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 2000. 
SNELL & WILMER 
orneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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•ffvsivtaf wm&an, dian «r mifiwu; u iiufe. tfc* Uiatsu «f Oityvr «rf Seller. Noaeilitka. <h« Buyer M4 £*• Setter may tegallr »p»« *• '•riuaj la &kcr 
or rfete» povtsuaf of mil *nn. S«et kf«i a^iee ftwn 5«w Mtoracy or ax *t*wmr fe«fer» «»cwi«t U*« » bt*«fiic C«atracL 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
j Buyer 
C o n t r a l P l o r i d a ZzrmatsiQnzs, I n c . 
'en to purchase the Property described below and deisven a* Earaest Mawey Oepoalt S S O , 0 0 0 fa the form of fl/ft „ 
ifte Brokerage, to be deposited within three business days ailcr Acceptance of this Offer to Purchase by all parries, 
ihe Title/Escrow Company identified below, 
-j^ Dkcrage or rule/Escrow Company xUJL-. .Address P - O - ^ 3 2 S 8 . Park C l t v . U C s h 
ceved by ffrirfi^ ^ " " ^ i n _ _ on Juna,ff<f« l?9f l (date) Phone Number 4 3 3 - g 5 S - 0 3 3 f 
TiUc/£x:mw Company) for deposit no later than (date) flM „ 
i f t /3 ^ 3 ^ 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
PROPERTY: 
r o s e w o o d , « « * a t t a c h e d I s g * ! d a e r c r l p t i o n , approTT4.TOfcialy 5*^"^ 
ddress At- r_h« b a a ? o f a T h * CatrrtMHf* Cry IlZfl _ County -232ZSHi£ State ?Sflh 
2r legal description, ee* *2 attached Addendftm 0 1 «» preliminary- tide report when avertable as provided below. 
1.1 INCLUDED ITEMS: Unless excluded heron, thie sale shall include all (Unices presently attached to the Property. The following personal property thill 
(so be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: 
iZa „ 
L2 EXCLUDED ITEMS: These Items ere excluded from this sale: 
i /a 
. PURCHASE PRICE AND FINANCING. Buyer agreea to pay (or the Property as follows: 
; 5JLJl4fl. Zantac Money Deposit 
» \2 . SOP , 000. f ^  y r ^ ^ t ; 
L i Representing the liability to be assumed by Buyer under an oaisting aexumable loan (LJwith LJwithout Seller be l^eased of 
liability) m (hie approxumte amount with Q Buyer QSeller agreeing to pay any loan transfer and assumption fees. Any net 
J difference! between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual balance it Clodag shall then be adjusted in 
*J0*~y$f^ Ocash Docher */* 
fy* P0^ *—' P*0"* a c o f institutional financing oo terms no less favorable to the Buyer than the following: " / * (interest rate Cor first 
period prior to adjustment, «f any); fl/fl (amortization period); «*/* (term). Other than these, the toan terms 
shall be the beat obtainable under the loan for which the Buyer applies below. 
-_ a From Seller-bcJd financing, ta described in the attached Seller Ptoaactag Addendum. 
if,- ^  ^ ayu&fl ' * ^ ~ lkJL^ — — — 
t ^ ^ , ^ 1 1 ^ Q0Q">i«i««t^
 a f Purchase Price m cash at dosing 
j l S r a f l a , 0 0 0 TOTAL PURCHASE PftlCE 
X CLOSING. Tbis wnsactieo ihall be closed on or beiere MdUffldwa „ , Cksfitg shall occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each 
other (or to the escrow/tide company), all documents required by this Centred; by the Lender, by written escrow instructions signed by d»e Buyer and the 
Seller, and by applicable law; (b) the money* required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the caxrow/tirlc company in the form of 
collected or cleared (Unds; and (c) the deed which th« Seller has agreed to deliver under Ssabm 6 has been recorded. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-
haiif of aie escrow Closing fee. unless; otherwise a|7ecd by the panic* in writing- Tunes Md uicnmcms for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed 
obligations shall be prorated as set forth m this Section. All deposits on tenancies shall be mmsfcrred to Buyer ae Goslag. Prorations set forth in this Section 
a a a 
««l Estate Pureha«^Carttrset 
«var<s| ^ t T g f f Se*er(3) <&£• 
aalFAST® &*<£~Bc* 4700. Friaca. CO OJ443. Version 5^. OftoslFArm, 1998: Rep^ PUTUAR225436 
ompleieo 0y • Branl A. FtacHn, Priodpal Sro«ort Ooor Crt&l Roa«y 1 c{ 4 
Q«H2«a 03:17:49 ^ 
i V T ^ n 
be made J»S of date of O w i n g ; xt xsJteasion; Other £ 1 L & 
0SSES.SION, Seller shall deliver possession 10 Buyer within . • ., P hours after G o * * ^ . 
r O N H R ^ A T I O N O F AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract the Lining Agent K a r l or; fjT-Qflfry _ 
tsents <& Seller D Buyer, and the Sailing Agent fl<r^ntl ^ T ^ i f l represents LJSeller «Si Buyer. Quyer and Seller 
Trm ihti prior to s i t i n g this Cassraef written disclosure of the agency relationship was pmvtded to him/her. ( ) Buyer's inmate ( .) Seller's initials-
m~£ TO PROPERTY A W TTTLE INSURANCE, (a) Seller has, or shall have s( Casing, free atle to the Property and agrees to convey
 9veix l f j | c ]Q 
crby B general L J special warranty deed. Crzc of financial encumbrances a* warranted under Section J 0.6: (bj Seller agrees to pay for. and famish 
er at Closing with, a current standard form Owner's poliey of title insurance in the amount of the TotaJ Purchase Price; (c) ihc title poiicy shall conform 
\ Seller's obligations under subsections (a) and (b). Unlets otherwise agreed wuicrSection 8.4, the cornrnirment shall conform **ith the title insurance 
sracrrteat provided under Section 7.L 
3 The Quyer elects to obtain a fliU-coverage extended ALTA policy of title insurance under 6(b). The cost of this coverage, above inat o f a standard 
neTs policy, shall be paid for by the U Buyer S Seller. Alio, the cost of a full-coverage ALTA survey, shall be paid for by the O Buyer EISel ler . 
. T E O F I C U N D E R T A K I N C 3 O ? SELLER AND BUYER. 
7.1 SELLER DISCLOSURES. The Seller will deliver to the Buyer the following Seller Dticlaiures no later than the number of calendar days indicated below 
ich shall be days after Acceptance: (day*) 
(a) a Salhr property Condition Disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller: 30 
(b) s commitment for the policy of title insurance fequic*d under Section 6. to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller. 2H 
including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment: 
(c) a copy Of ail loan documents relating » any loan now existing which will encumber the f reperty a(kr Cosing: *?0 
(d) a copy o f all leases and rental agreement* now ia effect with regard to the Property together with a current, rent roll: .TO 
LJ (c) operating statements of the Pranerty for Its last ?*/a full fiscal yesr* o f eperaiton plus die current fiscal year 10 
through 1 1 ^ . — - . cert! (ted by (he Seller or by an independent auditor: 
S ( f ) tenant Estoppel agreements; . J*0 
Her agrees to pay any charge for cancel latum of the tide commitment provided under subsection (b). 
If Sciler does not provide any of the Sitter Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, Che Buyer may cither waive the particular Seller Disclosure 
^uirernent by taking no timely action cr the Buyer may noufy the Seller in writing within 1? calendar days after the espirarion of the particular 
sctosure lime period that the Seller is in Deftualt under this Contract and that the remedies under Section U are at the Burr's disposal. The holder of the 
ornest iMoney Deposit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's writien notice, return to the Quyer tt^ Earnest Money Denoiie wichout Uw requirement of 
nher written audiorizarion from the Seller. 
7^ QTJYXR UNDERTAKIWCSL The Buyer agrees lo: I u 
IS (a) Apply for approval of the aasumpuon or tundm^ of ihc toati proceeds described m Section 2 by completing, signing and 
delivering to the Lender the initial loan application and docurnentalion required by the Lender and by paying all fees as 
Tecvtred by die Lender (including ipptwsal toe) no later than - 1 5 , „ calendar days after Acceptance; and « _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ — 
EJ (b) No later than 3Q calendar days after Acceptance, obtain from the Lender to whom application is made 
under subsection (a) a wriuen commitment to approve the assumption of die existing foan or to fund the new loan 
subject only to changes of conditions in Buyer's credit worthiness and 10 normal loan dosing precedurca; or. if Buyer 
elects* providing the Seller widi absolute assurance, within the same time (rame. that the proceeds required for funding 
the Total Purchase Price are available. _ _ _ _ _ _ 
these Buyer Undertakings arc at the sole expense of the Buyer and are material elements of ihts Cantract for the benefit of both the Buyer and ihc Seller. 
If Buyer does not initiate any Buyer Vaderuklnf, and provide Seller widi written confirmation in the rime agreed above, the Seller may either waive Uie 
lanicular Bayer Undertaking requirement by taking no Umely action or the Seller may notify die Buyer m writing within 30 calendar days of the 
taptratton of the particular undertaking time period that (he Buyer is in Default under uHta Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 axe al the Sellers 
tapes?!. The holder of the Sarweet ftfenay Depesit shall, upon receipt of a copy of Sellers written notice, deliver to ins Seller the Earnest Monty Deposit widiout 
he requirement of further written aouusfttauon (bm tha Buyer. 
7-3 ADDITIONAL PUS DILIGENCE. Taa Buyer shall undertake the following Additional Due Diligence elements at its own expense and for ia uw,> 
benefit for die purpeso of complying with the CeRilagcncles under S*ctxo* I: 
(a) Ordering and obtaining sat appraisal of the Property \[ one is not otherwise required under Section 7J; 
(o) Crdcnng and obtaining a survey of the Preperty if one ia not otherwise required under Section 6: 
SI (c) Ordering and obtaining any emWronmentalry related study of ihc Property; 
S ( d ) Ordering and obtaining a physical inspection report mgafding. and completing a personal inspection e< the Proparty; 
B (e) Koquestlng and obtaining ^artllcaticn that (he Property complies with ail applicable federal, state, and local taws, ordinances, and regulations '.villi 
regard to zoning and perrmssiWc use of the Property. 
Seller agrees us cooperate folly with Buyers completing these Due DBlgeace matters and to make the Property available as reasonable and necessary for ihc 
sarne. 
L CONTINGENCIES. This offer is subject as the Buyers approving h\ ics sole discration the Sellar Dfsdossres, lite Bayer Undertaking!, snd Additional 0u« 
Diligence matters \n Section 7. However* to Buyer's discretion in approving the terms of the loan under subsection 7J (b) 1% subject to Buyer's covenant 
with regard to minimally accepcable Onandnf terms tinder Section 2. 
SA Buyer shall have *5 calendar days after Ihe times specified in Section 7J and 7J for receipt of Seller Disclosures and for completion oi 
:aal Estar^ucchaf ewC^ntract > 
taa^ASTWWTW^^e* 4700. Frisco. CO 30443. Voiron S.S. ©SaalFAST®. t99i: Rftfl^  PUTTJAR225435 
U3mfl>et8d oy - B^nt A, F«mn, Principal Snjfeer, Deer Croat Kaaliy „ , ^
 4 Paoo i 9* ** 06/I2ft1i03:t7:49 y 
n r* r:^  4-. 
j , f Sure, object. Buyer and Seller *ri l»ve _ k i « ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ [ f ^ abjec!ion$ w e ^ 
„ * - u, rcoNc Buyer, ^ l * « » . * • » £ « ^ 5 l l . **, « I * r * * me ^  » * « * ^ HoWcr of .he F,,nMl „ „ , , y 
^ ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • Z r i B ^ - . «~M~,..*- *— *e ««*-«. *«* ^ ^ 
^ s r ^ s i s s r j v *** ««**—.»- ^ —— *—-~ -•*« 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ • ^ 1 : ^ ^ ^ - ^ d.*.' Hardin, ^ Property at 
^ • S T S ' P * - * * - Buyar vi«* K».Car Plan and initial bulldog- da.i^. w ± * i ^ « 
3.4. A paopia »" ^-P,-*-- to tii* buyar, on or bafora 12/1/3 8. 
CO 
on 
9 . 6 Buyar I s raaponaib la f o r a l l of til a ar&tar th&rao and/or connaeciona , on cka saaa 
aula as ena a © l i a r and o ther dwvalepara i n v o l v e d w i t h i n tha Canyon* Maotar P l a n . 
3 . 7 S o l l a r a a a l l apply f o r , %fith input from buyar, and o b t a i n F ina l Kaatar Plan ^xfJ^J 
pproval , a t a a l l a c s axpeaaa, on, or bafora 3 * l j 1, U 3 B . nu£**f- ^ /
 ( W?& £^""" - / ^ M 
5 . 8 This t r a n s a c t i o n a b a l l e l o s a on tba aasrliar o f 12 /31 /33 or 15 d&ya a f t a a j ^ r i a l 
aatar P lan a p p r o v a l . \J 
3 . 3 S n t i r a agraasaenfc i s aisb5«ct to Susniifc County Approval o f dana i ty , stoning and 
d a . 
he lent* of attached} Addendum 3 ^ are incorporated into thi* Coacraet by this reference 
1 SELLERS UMITED WARRAHTIESL. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the Property are limited to the following: 
10.1 When Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-deaa and free of debris and personal belongings; 
10.2 Setter wilt deliver possession of the Preporty Co Buyer n^th chs ptum&tng, plumbed ftswres, heating ecolin^. ventilating: electrical and sprinkler {indoor 
ml outdoor) systems, appliances, and fireplaces m working order; 
10J Seller will deliver possession of the Treftttxy va Doyer wirtl dw roof and foundation &M of leaks known to Selter; 
10L4 Seller will deliver possession of to ?r©p4rcy &» Buya" widi any privaia well or xptit tank ttp*\t\% the Property In working order nod m compliance wtdi 
.'ovemmenul regulooons: 
10^ Seller wlJI bo respormble for repwns my of Seller's moving-re!i<ed damage to the fronerty; 
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring eurrsu all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer and will discharge alt such 
Mgau'ona which Buyer has not so assumed; 
tO.7 As o( Gating. Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of aa environmental, building, or zoning code violation regarding the Property wiuch lias 
WK been resolved. 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRA?TTa3 AWfJ tNCLUDSD fTEMS. Aitar.all eontlngendes have been removed and before Closing, the Qyyer may conduct 
a *Nvalfc-dvough* inspection of the Property bo determine whemer or not itcrm wirrantcd by Sdlcr In Section 10.1
 % 10J. 10J &d 10J are in the warranted 
condition and to verify th*t items included in &ctio* l.l ore presently on die Proporty. If any item Is not in the warranted condition, Selter will con-act, repair 
or replace it as necessary or, with }im consent of Buyer and {it required) Lender, escrow an amount at Cosing to provide tar such repair or replacement. Vrtc 
Buyer's failure to conduct a **walk~dtrough* Inspection or to claim during tha "walk-through* inspection that the Property dees not include all items referenced 
in Section U or Is not m the condition warranted in Sketiam 10, shall constitute a waiver of Buyer's rights under Scaio* LI and of the wtrrannes contained in 
Section 10. 
12. CIIANCSS QC1RING TRANSACTION. Seller apees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, ao new leases entered into, and oo substantial 
alterations or hupiovcmcots to dta Prapovty shall bo undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
IX AUTHORITY OF SIGtfeHS. IT Buy«r ar Selter «a a corporation, parmershro, tnat. cstste, or other entity, the person signing this Caatract on its bclialf war. 
rants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Selter and the heirs or successors \n interest to Buyer or Seller. If die Seller k not die vested Owner of the 
?r9psrtf but has control over the vested Owners dispasuion of the Property, the Seller arrets to ssercise this control and deliver ode under this CaocrseC as l( 
it had been signed by die vested Owner. 
14. COMPLETE COrTntACT. Thi* tmnument (Together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller Disclosure* ) eonsriuues the enure Contrsct 
ioal Estate Purchase Contract \J 
AO-fii 
i . . ^ e d e s all Prior de». aetween the parties. Thu Cutrut cannot be ouni --cpl by written agreement
 0f l h e plirllcs. 
T „ 7 1 of the Amcnon Aiburanon A c t i o n . lUeh p.rty . ^ ^ n t t - « « , of meduuon. Any Agreement s.gned by the par, ics 
™ J T J L ~ ** be » * * . f - d i . u o n I f c the ***** « * « , » d . « * . m f l * . « * r d * Cootr.ct * U * * * * * l„
 te 
T h " b , t *e Buyer from .ee.cn, **«*= p e r f o r c e by the Seller by l i fe , . con,pl..n. -ith the court. tervn, ,t on the idler by t n e ^
 0r 
L , TJZxn*. permitted by Uw. « d record*, . ft , « • * - « • ^ r d ,0 the « * . prided ft* the Buyer perm.a the ScKer to
 retrlm t r o m 
Mrin. the complaint pending meduuon. AIM the parties twy ayee in writing n w*ve med.mon. 
r ^ I o L T Tourer default,. Seller „ y elect » either reuin the Eame* Money Dcptutr U liquidated d.mages o, to return the E r a * M.»«y D , P „ . , 
L Buyer io enforce Seller", righu. If SdUr defcul* I- addition to return of the Z.r,«< M.ney Dep.tlt. Buyer may elect to etthcr « « p , „*n ScHer „ 
^ L P M « * « - «*«»' - * • S»r,«*MoBe,D«p«n or ,ue Seller for specific perfomw.ee »d/or d . r m ^ . If 3«r*r elecu to accept OK hqu,-
^ d ^ T S t *
 >8re« to p . , ft. liquid.** c t o ^ » Buyer »pe, * * - * Where » fa*- of <M> Contact provides . .pee..* remedy, the par.e* 
.A ,.,,. >he irmedv shell be exclusive regwrflcu of rights which might otherwise be ivwlable under common l»w. 
o S o S m O N OF EAitNEffT MONEY. T*e Jkn,«. Moaey f>.p«lt * d not be retased unto, it i« .uthorized by: (,) * « « . U 7.2 « i *.,.- (b, 
« K wrinen .greement of d* p^rtia. !«Iudin» . agreement under &eKM « If (•) * « « .pplr. or (e) court order. 
ABROGATION. Ettept for «pre* Mrrutia rn.de m thil Contmet. the provirion. of thil Contract ™)I not «PpJy »««r CI-«oe. 
RISK OP LOSS. All rule of low or darrage to the Property thall be home by Seller until OwInC-
T S E B OFTHE ESSENCE Time b of the e«ene8 r e d i n g ft. dice, « t (bnh in to . a c t i o n , e ^ u i . * . muet be agreed to « — s by ,11 p ^ . c . 
Z i n c - under e»eh **** of ftb C « W . « -hich reference, . d»ce «W! be required .b-.ut.ly by 5:00 F-M, Mountain TUne on ft. t0.ed date. 
COWrmTAKISANO FACSTMILS (FAX) DOCUMENTS. Thl* Ontr,e. m.y be tijned in cou«,erp«t*. » i e==h counter^ bonne » ongtnal 
^ ™ b e c o h e r e d one document wid, .11 other* bcring origitul agn.u^re. Alw. S i m i l e « M » of - .y tigred onpno. document and ~-
, _ u - - _ -I-3-y jjowd acsirmle tnnamutrion itall be the no* » delivery of m erijioal. _ 
ri u f t a o t o . ^ r - ^ - • W c v - n u ^ t e , a, ft.. 0U*r p^y or ft. other p«r/S .sen, th.t the offer or counteroffer h* been s ^ * requ.red. 
a Z ^ W m t A C O r r U l C t . Buyer offer, . purchue ft. froperty on the above term, » d condluon, If SeUer doe, not « « ft. ott.r 
' ^ H ^ L - i T t e ; J ^ O « • H H _ _ - . 0 * - f l k r « t a r « - - * . * o l * r r f * . b ^ . Money Dcp,.,, 
yi reaim it to the Buyer. 
Cactral Flori' 
5YSR • 3 S2CN31TTJR2 
By: D a ^ i d S t a g s 
DATS 
ACCE?TAKCEm£JSCT!ON/COUrrniROFFER 
Kc^™t«Bce of OtV4t %» ?urch«se: S«II«r Ac«aU the foresoiflg olTcr «i lhe terim and eomHtiow sptdC«J above. 
Parkwaat: Aa^cclatM and S e ^ a r t o ^ ^ ^ t M 
ay« waltar Plum QtM f^~^ <> H ^ 
DAT2 T3H^ 
3 Rejection: SeilerReJects On foregoin« oifer. 
^Seller's inidali) ^(D-tc) ^^TiniB) 
3 Counter flfcJ P-en« for Buv« Aeeep^e. ft. u ^ of Buyer", offer s-bjea t, ft. «c=puc« or mod-feuon, » speoHed . *e 
Caunter OlTer * * 4 * -
ial Esrato Purcftaso Conorsct 
•3IFAST© Ponns. 80s 4700. Fftjco. CO 30443, Vertfen 5.5. eftesJPAST«. 1993: &*& PUTUAR22S43S 
imoiaUd t)y - Breni A. Ferrfn. fiincuai Srckar* Do& CfMl Ro«Uy 
06/12^8 03:17:49 
Psgc 4 0/ 4 
02-82 
Deer Crest Realty 
P.O. Box 3268 
1375 Deer Valley Drive, Suite 210 
«-Ton* Park City, Utah 84060 SK? 
Phone: {435} 655-0555, Fax: (435) 645-9483 
- & ADDENDUM NO.i 
^ REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
iS IS AN E L AODENOUS* O COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (lha -REPC) wfm an Offer Inference 
4e of vTUPgyiHi l??fl — , Including alt prior addenda and counteroffers, between 
Cautra l F l o r i d a I n v a s t a a n t a , l a c . 
Buyer, and 
Parkwaat A a s o c i a t a s and Shaver Craak A s s o c i a t e s 
Seller, regarding ifta Property located at 
rosfcwood P a r c a l , l o c a t a d a t t a a basa o f °Tha Canyona* s k i a r a a . 
iW*4 w fedtowwg terms are haratoy Incofpcfatsd as part a( fta REPC: 
. T h i s o f f a r suparcadas t a a Raal Satata Purcaasa Contract datad A p r i l 2 2 , 1398. 
. Buyer a h a l l purchase apprgicl«atoly 29 afcr»« sa praparad by S a l l a r 1 * A r c h i t e c t i n 
g r h i b i t 8A% a t t a c h e d harato and ^ ^ ^ ^ i L s i S ^ tharaof . 
. The P r o p e r t y a h a l l ba conroyad by ^ S ^ S t P w a r r a t i t y Dead. 
« S a i l o r s h a l l prov ide Standard Gvnars P o l i c y a t S a i l e r 1 a axpansa. 
• 3 a l l ar s h a l l prov ida a, copy of tha survay praparad by Bush a Cuadgal l . 
. Buyar s n a i l submit Buyar* a p l a n to SxsmdLt County ais iul tanaoualy v i t a S a i l o r ' s 
s u b m i t t a l . Tha plan, a a a l l Include a r c h i t a c t u r a f o r a 400 u n i t fciaaahara p r o j act« 
. Tha d a a i c n ap*|^JLccation of tha 9 ?aep la Mbvar* Bust ba accaptabla to tha Canyons 
R a s o r t ^ x t h i n s c f f i E l a t i o n and coat Co b* approvad by. d s l l a r . 
, Buyar u n d e r s t a n d s and agroas t o taa f o l l o w i n g * 
.-a) Susaoit County ha* a t a t a d that i t s pra£arrad davalopmant i s t i a a s h a r a , incarvaJL 
/ a * n a r s h l p , o r a o t a l / a o t a l . 
b) S a l l a r , cm i t s Mastar ? l s n , ha* an a d d i t i o n a l 257 u n i t a of whola o w a r a h i p 
* i n c l u d i n g €2 r a a i d a n t i a l l o t s , whi<?h s h a l l raaaJLn aueh a f t a r Buyar*a County 
a p p r o v a l s ara r a e a i v a d . 
*y fimm-tf rmmty^and taa Canyeas^juva^^ndicafcad a s o v e r a l l squara foo t parsmatar 
of approximata iy •050,000 -to. gsaj&fi) squara f s a t . 
d) I t a*ay b^ nacasaary t o obta in firnaa Summit County a waivar f o r tha a d d i t i o n a l 
£ 
aquar* f o o t a g s i n taa tisMshara port ion, nacasaary f o r Buyara raquirad u n i t s . ^ p - ~^$4r(i 
It tba a d d i t i o n a l squara feo taga cannot ba o b t a i n e d , t h i s c o n t r a c t 9*Y b a t ^ j / ^^ 
c a n c a l l a d i n w i t l a g &T a i t h a r Buyar o r S a l l a r . Cr*JL \£»(L**"^V^ 
a) f fc o * « a i a BAy ba 
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1 I Then it goes through and says, "Nothing in this 
2 section shall prohibit the buyer from seeking specific 
3 performance," and also "The parties may agree in writing to 
4 waive mediation." Well, the parties agreed to arbitrate, not 
5 to mediate. 
6 THE COURT: Uh-huh. From the first reading of that 
7 language, that 60-day provision, it's always troubled me in 
8 the back of my mind that when it talked about failure to reach 
9 agreement in 60 days, that's more a mediation concept than an 
10 arbitration concept. So I don't think it helps — it's just 
11 I another confusion to me, but it's a confusion. 
12 MR. GAYLORD: Whether it's a mediation or arbitration 
13 concept, your Honor, the key is what's the remedy in the end. 
14 What the parties contracted for is whether it's a mediation or 
15 an arbitration, what the parties contracted for is the remedy, 
16 and that's what's important here. 
17 The remedy is contract — they get back here this 
18 morning, and the contract is null and void if they can't reach 
19 an agreement on the terms of the dispute. 
20 THE COURT: But you don't reach an agreement on an 
21 arbitration, do you, Mr. Gaylord? It's imposed upon you. 
22 MR. GAYLORD: Ordinarily, yes, your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: Yes, and then it comes to one other issue 
24 for me that no one raised directly, but it troubled me, too, as 
25 I read. That is, in this case — I mean, what I said in the 
-9 
1 minute entry I think is correct. There was definitely an 
2 intent to not let this drag out, but isn't it possible that 
3 I this is a sham in the sense that if you can — if this is sort 
4 of an agreement thing, if I say, "Arbitrate," you have your 60-
5 day provision, if it can just be dragged out 60 days, it's all 
6 over. It could be — the whole intent could be thwarted. 
7 MR. GAYLORD: Certainly the intent to be thwarted, I 
8 guess if there's any cause of action that it stems from, is if 
9 there was a bad faith effort in the context of the arbitration. 
10 THE COURT: Yeah. 
11 MR. GAYLORD: If somehow we don't have a reasonable 
12 effort to try and reach an agreement. What the arbitration 
13 provision provides, I think, is the arbitration provision 
14 provides that, look, we have a Real Estate Purchase Contract 
15 that was entered into early on in the process. We didn't know 
16 what Summit County was going to do. This is what they had 
17 hoped for, and if we could meet those terms and conditions 
18 based upon a collective effort, not just by Park West, but 
19 by CFI. 
20 As the Court may recall, one of the factors the Court 
21 looked at in whether specific performance could be implied, is 
22 was there an impossibility of performance, and whether or not 
23 CFI had complied with its side of the bargain. The Court, I 
24 think, found that it didn't. So — 
25 THE COURT: Uh-huh, I remember. 
-10-
MR. GAYLORD: And so we're sitting at a point where we 
have two parties who may want to still structure a deal, so 
they have an arbitration clause that says, "Look, if we don't 
have the agreement as we've currently written it, we've got an 
arbitration clause. Let's see if we can sit down and negotiate 
a new deal." 
If we can't, all you're going to do is get back 
your earnest money. We don't want to have to waste our time 
fighting over, you know, whether you have what you have, and 
if they don't, they get a null and void. It's rendered null 
and void because they don't want to delay it any further, if 
they can't reach an agreement on what the development will look 
like. 
So that's what the purpose of the agreement was, and 
that's what both sides will say. Both sides will say that they 
had an arbitration clause. They put it in there. They agreed 
to it. Yet they couldn't reach an agreement on an arbitration 
if there was a dispute over the terms of the contract, because 
there is a dispute over what happens to the earnest money. 
They think they get to file a litigation, pursuant to 
paragraph 15. Our position is they don't. Why don't they? 
Because if you look at two things; one, if you look at the 
addendum, it says, "To the extent the terms of this addendum 
modify or conflict with any provisions of the RVPC, including 
all prior addendum counter offers, these terms shall control." 
A 
-11-
I submit that there was a conflict between these two, 
because the conflict arises from the disposition of the earnest 
money deposit. If you look down here, paragraph 12 tells you 
what the disposition of the earnest money contract is — money 
is, if they can't reach agreement on the arbitration. It is, 
it gets back, and that's it. They say, "No, we can go ahead 
and file a lawsuit." There's a conflict there. 
More importantly is, under subsection 16 of the RAPC 
it says, "Where a section of this contract provides a specific 
remedy, the parties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive, 
regardless of rights, which might otherwise be available under 
common law." 
The exclusive remedy under this arbitration clause is 
that if they don't reach agreement, it's null and void. That's 
the remedy. They agreed when they signed the deal that they 
wouldn't litigate this case, because of the time frames that 
they were operating under. 
Yeah, they want to now bring back 15 and say, "But we 
can file a lawsuit. If we first mediate, and if we don't have 
successful mediation, then we're going to proceed with our 
litigation. 
I submit that this was to wipe out paragraph 15, and 
intended to be a replacement. It's in direct conflict with 
that, and it can't be read together, and because it can't be 
read together, it must file the addendum. The addendum is 
controlling. 
To address the issue of waiver, 
Court has any other questions. 
your Honor, 
-12-
unless the 
THE COURT: No, I confess I don't. I think I agree 
with you, and I'll hear argument, that as a general rule, the 
addendum should control, but if the addendum doesn't really 
provide anything, then I'm wondering where we are. That's 
where I'm struggling; if it really does provide an arbitration 
option. 
Generally when we order arbitration we're saying, 
"This is not going to be your forum. Arbitration is. You 
are going to get a binding decision out of a neutral partial 
arbitration," supposedly. 
Here, though, it's such a hybrid of arbitration and 
mediation, with the ability to say that if agreement doesn't 
occur within 60 days, you've got nothing except — and maybe 
this was the intent — you've got nothing but the earnest 
money. We're all moving on because the project is paramount 
thing here. Is that what you're saying? 
MR. GAYLORD: Well, in fact, I think that's exactly 
what Mr. Segal is saying in his affidavit. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. GAYLORD: He's suggesting in his affidavit that 
time is of the essence. In the contract it has a time of the 
essence clause. He says, "Based upon my visit with Brent 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and 
BEAVER CREEK ASSOCIATES, 
Defendants. 
INC., ' 
) MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
) TO QUIET TITLE 
1 Civil No. 990600361CR 
> Judge Pat Brian 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants, Park West 
Associates ("Park West") and Beaver Creek Associates ("Beaver Creek") (collectively "PWA"), 
by and through their counsel, hereby move that the Court enter an order dismissing this action filed 
by plaintiff, Central Florida Investments, Inc. ("CFI"), and releasing the notice of lis pendens 
F ILED 
DEC 1 3 1999 
Third District Court P < i 
Deputy Clerk, Summit County 
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recorded against the subj ect property. This Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum 
in Support of Motion to Dismiss and to Quiet Title. 
This is an action seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase contract that 
automatically terminated by its own terms over eleven months ago. The contract provided that 
closing would occur on the earlier of December 31, 1998 or fifteen days after Final Master Plan 
approval, that the "[e]ntire agreement [was] subject to Summit County Approval of density, zoning 
and use/' and that time was of the essence. Because Summit County never gave its approval, and 
the transaction failed to close by December 31,1998, the Purchase Contract automatically terminated 
by its own terms on December 31, 1998. Therefore, PWA respectfully requests that this Court 
dismiss this action, with prejudice, on the grounds that CFI cannot state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted. 
At a minimum, however, this Court should release the lis pendens, which was recorded 
against the entire seventy-five-acre Frostwood parcel. The lis pendens constitutes a wrongful lien 
under Utah law. In addition, CFFs claims are barred by laches because over eleven months has 
passed since the Purchase Contract terminated, and PWA has expended valuable time and resources 
to obtain Summit County's approval of the development of over 7,000 acres within The Canyons 
Specially Planned Area ("The Canyons SPA"). Finally, because the lis pendens threatens to 
irreparably harm the viability of The Canyons SPA in its entirety, the equities dictate that this Court 
immediately release the lis pendens. For these reasons, PWA respectfully requests that the Court 
grant this Motion. 
UT_DOCS_A 1030391 v 1 - 2 -
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DATED this 8th day of December, 1999. 
BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS & INGERSOLL, LLP 
Mark R. Gaylord 
Craig H. Howe 
Attorneys for Park West Associates and 
Beaver Creek Associates 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the 8th day of December 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO QUIET TITLE to be mailed by certified mail, return 
receipt requested, to: 
David A. Siegel, President and 
Chairman of the Board 
Central Florida Investments, Inc. 
5601 Windhover Drive 
Orlando, FL 32819 
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Alan L.Sullivan (3152) 
Robert W. Payne (5534) 
Todd M. Shaughnessy (6651) 
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P. 
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801)237-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 237-1950 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Central Fl 
Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CENTRAL FLORIDA INVESTMENTS, I Case No. 990600361 CR 
INC., 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
Honorable Robert Hilder 
vs. 
PARKWEST ASSOCIATES and BEAVER 
CREEK ASSOCIATES, 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f)(3), and by stipulation of the parties and 
their counsel, the following matters have occurred and/or are scheduled as indicated. 
I. ATTORNEY'S SCHEDULING CONFERENCE: Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
26(f)(1), a telephonic meeting was held on February 4, 2000, at 10:00 a.m. 
A. The following participated in the telephonic scheduling conference: 
Robert W. Payne, Esq. representing plaintiff Central Florida Investments, Inc., and Mark 
Ho.. 
F I L E D 
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Third District Court _ 
Deputy Clerk. Summit County <J 
lorida Investments, 
0440 
R. Gaylord, Esq. representing defendants Parkwest Associates and Beaver Creek 
Associates. 
B. The parties have discussed the nature and basis of their claims and 
defenses. 
II. INITIAL DISCLOSURE: On or before March 3, 2000, the parties will exchange 
information required by Rule 26(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
HI. DISCOVERY PLAN: The parties jointly propose to the court the following 
discovery plan: 
A. FACT DISCOVERY 
1. All fact discovery will be completed no later than August 31, 2000. 
2. Fact discovery will be limited in accordance with Rules 30 and 33 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. EXPERT DISCOVERY 
1. Expert discovery shall proceed according to Rules 26(a)(3) and 
26(b)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. The identity and Rule 26(a)(3)(B) reports of's retained experts will 
be submitted by the parties on or before September 29, 2000. 
3. The identity and Rule 26(a)(3)(B) reports of any rebuttal experts 
will be submitted by the parties on or before November 1, 2000. 
4. Depositions of retained experts shall be conducted in accordance 
with Rule 26(B)(4)(A). 
2 0450 
IV. OTHER ITEMS 
A. The cutoff date for amending pleadings, including joining of additional 
parties, is March 30, 2000. 
B. The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions is 
February 15,2001. 
C. Pretrial disclosures shall be made in accordance with Rule 26(a)(4) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
D. The parties request the Court to hold a telephonic Pretrial Conference 
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of scheduling 
dates for the final pretrial conference and for trial of this matter. 
DATED this 4th day of February, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
Robfert Hilder 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
y vC ^'L^<-
Mark R. Gaylord 
Craig H. Howe 
Attorneys for Parkwest Associates 
and Beaver Creek Associates 
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